HomeMy WebLinkAbout1974-03-19; City Council; 3042; Longevity Pay Studyl 4.
2 i£ C T T Y O F
Agenda Bill No. 1S '4
Referred To:
C A R L S B A D, J C A L I c^ O P, it .T A
Date: March 19, 1974
Subject: Submitted By:
Longevity Pay Study Wm. C.-Baldwin
Asst. to City Manager
VJ3
Statement of the. Afa tter
The City Council, at the request of Councilman Lewis, asked that the
Personnel Department prepare the study of longevity pay. This has
now been accomplished with the attached report.
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Exhibit
Department Study - Longevity Pay
Staff Recommendation to -the City Manager
It would appear that -after careful consideration, the substitution
of an Education Incentive Planfoutweighs the advantages of straight
longevity pay. The report shows that from a dollar and cent stand
point, the EIP is much n;ore beneficial to the individual employee.
After assembling and reading the data available to me, I recommend
that longevity pay not be reinstated.
AB fro' Da to: - March 19, 1974
City dfanager's Recommendation
Concur with staff recommendations. The City Council should
understand that under present labor laws and meet and confer
obligations, this question can be raised in any given year
by the employees. The recommendation by the staff that -
longevity pay not be established at this time does not
mean that as part of salary negotiations we would not find
ourselves in a different position in the future.
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Council Action
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`' 3-19-14 The Longevity Pay Study was accepted.
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CITY OF CARLSBAD
Department of Personnel
DEPARTMENT STUDY TITLE:
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:
LONGEVITY PAY
A study to determine the feasibility of the re-establishment
of the longevity pay plan, not necessarily as a motivational
factor but, as a means to create equity for those employees not in
a position to draw education incentive program pay and who pre-
viously claimed $15/5 yr. - 25/10 yr. - 40/20 yr. before the
adoption by the City Council of the Griffenhagen-Yroeger, Inc.
position classification and salary plan report which recommended:
"No provision has been included in the plan for longevity
payments to any employee. We are well aware of the City's existing
practice of making such payments in amounts of $15, $25, and $40
based on lengths of service. We are unable to recommend that
this practice be continued because of such payments being contrary
to sound and accepted practices of public personnel administration.
We recognize the growing tendency of public agencies to make
longevity payments but such is not yet the prevailing practice.
Znthermore, in those cases where longevity payments are made it
is well accepted that they should not be in flat amounts appli-
cable to all employees irrespective of the salaries they receive.
We recommend that the City discontinue its present practice of
longevity payments until such time as it becomes the prevailing
practice of other cities. Furthermore, if and when the practice
is resumed, we recommend that it be based on a more equitable
method of payment."
CURRENT SITUATION:
The longevity pay plan was terminated June 30, 1970 with the
adoption of the GHK report. City management from July, 1970 to
July, 1973 staunchly advocated education incentive program pay
as a substitute for straight longevity program pay. As a result
three separate education incentive programs, relative to a majority of
permanent and full time employees were initiated during this period.
That a certain number of employees who previously had drawn
longevity pay are not benefited by one of these programs causes
a mild but continuing rumble of inequity. As a result of the
rumble Councilman Lewis has requested a problem study.
Of the 40 present employees who were affected by the dis-
continuance of the longevity pay practice 16 are receiving
Page 2 - LONGEV" Y PAY STUDY REPORT - 1 /29f
EIP pay, and when polled voiced satisfaction with the substitution.
The area in which the greatest number of employees have been
adversely affected is that of public works, including parks.
Seven employees relinquishing longevity pay are not presently
eligible for EIP pay and it is likely that because of age and the
circumstances surrounding the lack of clearcut available academic
training, probably would not strive for this achievement.
Eight of 14 police department employees eligible in 1970
for longevity pay are now receiving EIP pay. POST certificates
earned with a combination of time, POST seminar and academic
credits establish EIP eligibility with relative facility.
It is possible that more employees than have applied for EIP
pay are eligible. But for lack of understanding of the program
have not made the effort to gather the necessary data. For
example, one highly motivated and formal education oriented police
department employee has encouraged two 15 year employees, who have
no real knowledge of the scope of their credit accumulation, "to get
the records together." In each case it is apparent that no more
than the achievement of 3/6 college units will make these two
eligible for POST Advance Certificate which would give each an
additional 7 1/2% per month.
Four of seven longevity eligible fire department employees
are drawing EIP pay. A fifth, under the impression that EIP is
geared for the new and the young has not bothered to apply for
the program pay. When pressed into action by this reporter it is
evidenced that, possibly, he is eligible for an additional 5%
per month.
It should be noted that the administrative and department
management groups are not included for discussion in this report.
A recently established Executive Salary Schedule brings possible
equity for the administrative and department head group but not
for those excluded from EIP pay in the miscellaneous category.
DISCUSSION•:
Researching current data for trends regarding the inclusion of
the longevity benefit has been difficult. Both the League of
California Cities and the Management Information Service, conducted
by the International City Managers' Association forwarded material
dating back one and two decades.
Mr. Kenneth C. Frank, Staff Assistant with the League
directed us to the City of Alameda for a more recent study.
Exhibit A is a fact-finding study to support or negate a police
employee group benefit request in the City of Alameda, California.
Mr. John Goss, Assistant City Manager of Alameda and the perpe-
trator of the study states:
A
Page 3 - LONGEV- `Y PAY STUDY - 1/29/74 "
"From our research it is clear that: (1) education incentive
programs represent the trend of the future and longevity pay
programs represent the trend of the past among municipal police
agencies; and (2) it is difficult for cities to get rid of a
longevity program, once started, although those that have, have
done so by eliminating longevity pay and applying education
incentive pay for new hires. There may be some inequities for a
period of time, but they will be eliminated as your older employees
retire. Also, there are several 'combination' education incentive/
longevity plans around the state that might prove to be a com-
promise solution in some cases."
Three City of Carlsbad education incentive programs impose
no date from which the amassing of credits applies. Consequently
the "new hires" element is of no importance. In other words a 64
year old employee who accumulated 21 units 46 years previously needs
only two years of service to be ellg,.ble for added pay, giving him/
her an increase of 2 1/2% over base pay.
As a completion to this discussion it might be well to note
that of the two programs, longevity vs. education incentive, the
second is by far the more lucrative benefit using the following
example.
MAINTENANCEMAN $741 per month
(Accomplishing one 3 unit course per seven
semesters (2 1/2 year's time) and on to 14
semesters for 5 years of school one night per
week (approximately 3 hours) for 225 weeks.)
EIP PAY
2 1/2 year to
begin 3 1/2
year, 2 1/2%-$ 211
3 1/2 year to
begin 5 year,
5%----------- 667
5 to 10, 5%---- 2223
10 to 15, 5%--- 2223
15 to 20, 5%--- 2223
TOTALS $7547
LONGEVITY PAY
5th year to
begin loth
year ---------- $ 900
to begin 15th
year-t--T------- 1500
to begin 20th
year- ------ 2400
$4800
The above EIP figures are based on an accumulation of 45 units
only. An additional five years of study at the same pace and to
the 90 unit level would add an additional $2223 or more than twice
as much as longevity to the twenty year employment level.
Page - LONGEV-tY PAY STUDY REPORT - 1/29/14
RECOMMENDATION:
Having taken the major step to replace one benefit with another,
conceivably psychologically and remuneratively more satisfactory
to the individual and to the City, and because a relatively
small percent (12) of the total group is immediately affected,
reinstatement of longevity pay is not recommended. Too, the j
possibility exists that the 12% figure could be cut with the
proposed individual investigation on the part of the personnel j
department to determine if, indeed, employees in greater numbers
are eligible for education incentive pay.
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"• EXHIBIT '�= LONGEVITY STUDY = 1/24/74
Is longevity pay an approp,riatu itw,' for lnc:a. :., . ,,. is
3.3 percent package? The parties may urge appropriacu c:les;:i<< io:
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fact-finder to follow in answering this question.
INTROMICTTOIN
The longevity pay proposal of the Police Association 16
and straightforward. It provides for increases in compensation baa.ac. .
solely on seniority and not on any other factors. It propoces that, in
addition to the salary for each rant: represented in these procuadings,
that an additional 212-% salary increment be p:ovid-d after ten years, an
additional 5% salary increment after 15 yes:rs and an _,dcitional 7%
salary increment after 20 years of service with the Alameda 2o.ic,.
Department.
Longevity pay as a benefit concept is not nLw in this co,',
While not common in the private sector where fregaent salary :ncra.._,,
gained through the collective bargaining proccss have: a.itigatcd aga "
the need for longevity pay, it has baen used i,- various for7is in pub:i'.�
employment as a wage supplement in cases where employee salaries a ;
below average, as a substitute for infrequent salary adjusta.ants,'as a ,
means to compete with other e ploye:s for quali£fed emplvy-ecs, Fs a
technique to mitigate problems related to the lack o: adv: ncsa at �opp; r- `
tunity, and as a way to retain the skills of erperience4 _,,w11oy4aas- The
question before the fact -finder is whether longevity pay is ar :.ppro-
priate item for inclusion in the 3.3 percent packa;u for th:- ecnloy�--
represented by the Alameda Police Association. Since the pro;�asai
longevity pay was initiated by the Police Association, it is contento4
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by the City that the Association has the burden to shoe; Lhat lonaklvity ;
pay is appropriate, or especially suitable or proper, as a police be;,eLit,
and to indicate some criteria or rationale upon aiaich this appro",riate-
ness can be determined and justified. More broadly, it is contended
that the Association has the burden of proof to demonstrate that
longevity pay should be provided to the members represented by the
Association. Without completing this basic task, it is strongly argued
that the Association has not met its responsibility in this fact-.:indim;
proceeding, requiring that the question posed should be answered in the ,
negative.
While not accepting the burden of proof of the question, the
City will present arguments and material that will demonstrate that ''• .
longevity pay is inappropriate, or is not clearly suitable as a ben.Z it,
for police, based on a number of suggested criteria, such as prevailing
practice, the need to use longevity pay as a salary supplement, as a
technique to counteract infrequent salary adjustments, as a way to
compensate for the lack of advancement opportunity, and other reasons
that are commonly advanced in favor of longevity pay. The City also
will argue that longevity pay is inappropriate for policy reasons.
APPLICATION OF VAPIOUS CRITERIA IN '
DETEMMINING THE APP ROPRIATEN"US Or LONGEVITY a%Y
DOES NOT SUPPORT ITS IMPLEM12% TION AS PART OF
TOTAL COMPENSATION PLAN POR 0M2LOYE-.S !
REPRESENTED BY THE AUNIEDA POLICE ASSOCIATION
1. Prevailing Practice
a. Prevailing practic: has boon a commonly used critL;•:on
several years in measuring, and•deteimining the annronriatsncs,a of saln.N' ;
and otherhonofit imnrovomr•nts_for Ciro of ,+.t� rri^ st,t i-r':•, '
those renrosnntod by the Alar.n&, Pnl ico lvanc;;,t i,tin, '
During the pre-Meyers%XiIias -Brown 1%et d, y, chc City o:
Civil Service Board was responsible for making specific salary .end ot;.r
benefit recommendations to the City Counci► based on the foliow;n,, ,5clIcy..
considerations approved for the Board's direction by the City Ccurc:i at
its meeting of December 6, 1960.
111. Current experience .if the City in recruiting, c.aploying
and retaining employees of high quality.
112. Any changes which may have taken piacu in the value
relationships of the position or classification to
another.
113. The relative position of, the City with respect to - t
salaries, vacaL•ion and sick -:cave provisions, rut:n;-
Mont benefits, hospitalization and insurance proAr:,;•:,
and other elements affecting the conditions of Gr,;p1�y-
Mont."
114. The expressed policy of the City that salaries and
working conditions be at or near the average for
comparable ompioyment." (SEE EXHIBIT 1-A) '
Under this policy, the Personnub-1 Dopartmcont dcvclopad data '
which included applicable statistics from comparable cities of sin:lar
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size and organization within the same labor market area. This data,
using benchmark positions, e.g., the position of police officer fo:
the Police Department, included salary information from tho cities of
Richmond, Berkeley, Oakland, San Leandro and Hayward, and later tha
City of Fremont. This is illustrated by benchmark salary data sub.nic+:%.;c:
to the Civil Servicr_ Board in 1965 and 1969, and reproduced in E:1U,-a r 1-B.
A search through the minutes of the Civil Service Board and the C.'�y
Council reveals no objections by any employcc organizations to this ,
policy and sample of cities in determining salary and other.
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Since 1969, during the meet and confer process raqui.ud by
the Meyers-Mi1ias-Brown Act, this policy has remained unchangad and
the City and its employee organizations have used data from phis saK,L:
sample, along with Consumer Price Index information, in ncgotiaein;
salary and benefit levels each year. To ou;- recollcction, cherc have
been no formal or informal regoests to change this sample on behalf
of the employee organizations,
b. Prevailing practice does not support longevity nav A" a
beret it, therefore it is an inaporot)riate benefit for the eyrnloyaos
renresented by the Alameda Police Association,
A survey of the sample of cities with which Alameda comparas,`
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as a matter of policy and tradition, revsais that none provide longevity.
pay, while all such cities have education incentive plans.
Even expanding the sample to all 26 cities in AlanLda and '
Contra Costa Counties reveals only one, the City of Pittsburg, with y
longevity pay. Because of the difficulties experienced with their play%)
it was discontinued by Pittsburg for all employes hired after 1970.
Expanding the sample even further to the 73 cities in the nine;
county San Francisco Bay Area, only 7 have -longevity pay, 2 EMIBI •2-E,)
Of those seven, one (Pittsburg), as just mentioned discontinued the pro
gram for new hirees in 1970, another (Burlingame) provides only tar opti},n ..
to law enforcement employees of two salary supplements -- education
incentive pay or longevity pay -- while the Al=oda Police Association,
proposes an employee could receive both salary supplements a third
(Santa Clara) has attempted to eliminate their plan through the meat
and confer process, and the other four (Daly City, Millbrae, South San '
rrancisco and Morgan Eiil) the salary for police officer with longevity
pay is less than the agreed upon salary for an Alameda police officer
without longevity pay. This would tend to indicate th= in these four .'
jurisdictions longevity pay may be necessary _s a salary supplement to;' ,
maintain their competitive position with other employers of police
personnel, a situation not found, in Alameda. In the remaining four
cities in Northern California with longevity pay (Chico, Vacaville,
Sacramento and South Luke Tahoe) , the salary for police officer c_ri.th "
longevity pay is less than the agreed upon salary for an Plamcda palice '
officer without longevity pay.
State-wide, only 31 cities, including those just mentioned,
out of California's 407 cities have longevity pay for law enforcement
personnel. Twenty of these agencies are in Southern California. t'•mong;
t these cities, in one (Los Angeles) the plan applies only to patrolmen,
in another (Torrance) the program was discontinued for new hirees in
1970, in two (Gardena and Redondo Beach) an officer must choose betwe'::r
longevity and education incentive pay, and in tens the salary for police.'' "
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officer with longevity pay is less than the agreed upon salary for an
Alameda police officer without longevity pay.
It is abundantly clear that among the traditional sample of r
cities of comparable size and organization in the immediate labor'markdc
area with which Alameda has traditionally and as a matter of policy,
1Costa Mesa, El Centro, Imperial Leach, Laguna Beach, Arcadia,,,'
t Calexico, Coronado, National City, San :Marino, and Brawley, „
' compared for a number of years, and in the East Bay, prevailing pract�!�O•
does not support longevity pay. Parenthetically, Alaiac:da's i=ediwtu
labor market area does support another supplemental salary benefit, ..,
education incentive pay.
Even though there is some support for longcvity pay in Northerlri••
California with eleven cities claiming this b_anefit, tl;c significance df•
this support diminishes significantly when it is recognized that in ciAilt
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of these cities the police officer salary with longevity pay is less thj n '
the agreed upon salary for an Alameda officer without longcvity pay, in: -
one city it has been discontinued for new hires, and in another it is: ~
not in addition to, but only optional to, education incentive nay, in-
any event, the number of cities involved indicates that lorgevity pay is
not prevailing practice among cities in the San Francisco Bay Area or
Northern California.
Additional support for the longevity pay proposal is found in
Southern California, with 20 cities having this bene-Zit, b,:t a;ain thzs:•,
is undercut by the fact that ten cities pay their police officers less ;
with longevity pay than Alameda will without it, that one city has
discontinued the program for new hires, one applies the plan only to
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patrolman, and two provide only an option between ed--cation incentive
and longevity pay. In any event, the number of cities with this plan
in Southern California indicate that it is not prevailing practice =o6.(,
the hundreds of cities in this part of the State.
2, Other Criteria
The literature suggests other criteria to measure w1nethor or
not longevity. pay is needed and would be appropriately applied in
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public safety employment. In reviewing and evaluating these criteria.,..:;
i it is contended by the City that these rationale do not apply to the.-
• City of Alameda and that, therefore, longevity pay would not be an
especially appropriate benefit for employees in the Alameda Police
Department.
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a. Is longevity pav necessary to improve recruitment, rec:uce
turnover and retain experienced employees in the Alameda Police Department;
No. EXHIBIT 1-C shows that the number of applicants for the positiori.of
police officer have increased from 99 to 320 over the seven year period
of 1966 to 1973. During the same period, the number of successful candy
dates for police officer increased from eight to 15, with a high of 18- in •
September 1972. While a number of factors influence these figures,
certainly the compensation for the Alameda Police officer has not ;
diminished the City's ability to obtain a sufficient number of applia..ts
and successful candidates to fill the recruitment needs of the Department.:-
The turnover rate, as measured by the voluntary separation rare, '
is low, averaging 1.94 percent per year over the past five years, or 1:6 ;
voluntary separations per year. This indicates that the Department ,.
through compensation and other factors has been successful in retaini:ng*
its qualified sworn officers and that very few leave in mid -career to',,'
seek employment elsewhere. Also, none of the voluntary separations;, '
other than retirement, represent employees with over nine years on the;
force, indicating that the Department does not have a problem retaining
older, more experienced employees. (SEE EXHIBIT 1=D.)
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b. Is longevity nav necessary as a salary sunolcment to compan..
sate for infrequent salary increases? ,No. Sworn officers in the Alaiha&
Police Department have received salary incieases at least annually si^.de,
1949, and have received five increases totalling 35 percent since July. -It
1968. The agreed upon salary increase for this fiscal year would make.
total salary increases during this period of time amount to 40 percents; '
(SEE EXHIBIT 1-F.)
c. Is longevity nav necessary as a salary supplement because.;-
salary increases have not kept pace with the cost of livinc? No. As
EXHIBIT 1-F demonstrates, salary increases (35 percent, 40 percent with; ;-
this year's agreed upon salary- increase), greatly exceeds the; 22..56
percent in the cost of living from March 1968 through :Earth 1973, using,•+• •
as a guide the Consumer Price Index for the San Francisco Bay Area.
d. is longevity nay necessary as a salary sun nLement_to nairi 4
Lain a competitive_ salary position with comnrable cities in the sz;me "
labor market area? No. As EXHIBIT 1-0 illustrates, as of June 30, 1973i_
Alameda's top of the range pay step was at tha average of the six, citiee
for the classification of Police Officer and substantially above the
.average for the classifications of Sergeant and Lieutenant. On r
August 1, 1973, with the proposed five percent salary increase, AJamcda's
top of the range pay step would exceed the.average top step for the oLrer
six cities in all three classifications.
e. Is longevity pav necessary as a salary suonieatent to main:
tain a competitive total compensation Dosition with comparable cities in
the same labor market area? No. While comparative total compensation,,.,
data is more difficult to obtain from local public agencies due to •
inexperience in developing this data, the County of Alnnada prcparcl
such an analysis for all comparable cities in the imicdiat�a labor ;
market area, except for the City of Richmond. This data is rcpo;.-ted
in EXHIBIT 1-H, and reveals that tho City of Alameda's total comnsnsa-
tion package for the benchmark position of Police Off i.cr is conpetitiv'U'. ;
with comparable cities in the immediate labor market area. "
f. Is loneevity pay necessaty to ccmpansate for lac:: of
advancement within the Department? No, because during the past two ,
and one-half year period the opportunity for advancement has increased "
markedly in the Alameda Police Department due to a reorganizaLlon initi, ted
by its Chief. For purposes of comparison, during the 30 month ;�criod a,;
July 1, 1968, through December 31, 1970, there were six promotions,
including four sergeants and two lieutenants. rrom January 1, 1971, ;
through June 30, 1973, there were IS promotions, including 13 sergeants..
three lieutenants and two captains. This is not surp:isirg because as a
result of the department reorganization initiated on May 7, 1971, the .
number of promotional positions in the Department has increased by 35 a
percent, from 13 sergeants, five lieutenants, one Captain and one Chief,,
to 19 sergeants, five lieutenants, two Captains and one Chief. Based or
the current complement of sworn positions in the Department, 30.7 pe='c nt
of these positions are promotional. This provides an officer over tha-
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20-25 year period of his career With the Department substantial oppor-;
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tunity for advancement.
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POLICY COPS:DERAV ONS ,
Generally, longevity pay based solely on seniority runs
. contrary to the more current concepts of employee compensation provra_�s.'
As long as the basic salary and compensation plan is sound, most *)a, F
plan experts agree that there is little reason to justify longevity
pay. As Foster B. Roser, Personnel Director, City of P:aladelphia,
wrote in 1965,
"There is little value in such additional rates s:eniingly
predicated on long years of service, longevity adjust- t'
ments are somewhat akin to a fringe benefit for a selected
few employees. If a jurisdiction is fortunate to Lh,-
extent that its pay plan ref1_cts current rates, both at
the minimum and maximum, it is paying competitive rates.
Under those circumstances, there is no reason for govern-
ment to pay anyone above those in business or industcy,112
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In the textbook, Nunicinal Police Administration, pubiisied in 1969,
it is suggested that consideration be given to eliminating longevity
plans altogether in the police service.
"Some jurisdictions have sought to improve their ability
to retain employees by adopting a longevity pay plan.
Under such a plan, additional steps are available to
employees solely on the basis of seniority. For example,
one step might be added after 10 years service, and
another after 15 years. Mvile such stays are an incen-
tive to remain, the more fact they are given to all of
lil,e seniority discourages individual initiative. Lon-
gevity plans obviously cost money; their existence tunas
to hold down the entrance pay rate, thus handicapping,
recruitment. Consideration should be given to eliminating ,
longevity plans and concentrating instead upon improving
the basic pay rate.0
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2Foster B. Roser, "Keeping the lRay Plan Up -to -Date",
Practical Guidelines to Puiblic Pay Administration, Vol. 2, 1965, p, 97.•• -
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3Municinal Police Administration, Sixth Edition, 1969, p.
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Further comments on longevity pay, placing it in p_•opar perspecLxve
as a benefit is an evaluation'of the police and fire compensation and
assignment plans in the City oL Los Angeles completed by The Jacobs
Company in 1970.
"Longevity pay features in government pay plans becCxAQ
popular in a period %4on prevailing rates a.,d cost o=
living were increasing at a much sloar rate•. and
government pay schedules wcr%: only 1nfrcauinnLly ,
adjusted upwards. The purpose was to give an c:..pia, `•t
in a position vhere opportunities for pren{oticr, were
limited something to loot• fortmrd to alter iQ reached
I the maximum rare in the,pay rangy for his job and thus, r
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theoretically, to improve morale and reduce tur^over.
"In the Los Angeles setting today, and with the du;, ion
of recommendations in this report, th OasOn,, o
longevity pay for policemen and firm: n are no lor.-er; _
present. There is every likelihood that the salary
schedules will have to be adjusted upwards every year
} in the foreseeable future. The position of fireman
} is far from a "dead-end road" and that of policeman will
!!! not be either with the considerable opportunities in
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promotion now in the fire service and ti7c greatly
i increased opportunities for promotion in t:ra recom-
mended plan for police service.
! "With the improved base salaries reco:tncndad in this
report, the continuation of a longevity pay plan would `
simply provide a reward for not betting promoted are
;4 reduce the incentive for policemen and firemen to t
qualify for promotion,114
The City contends that longevity pay is inappropriate from a policy
i point of view for the following reason:
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1. Lonevity »ay does not recotnizc. the changes cinich have
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i ocSurred and are occurringin police workand police comoe=,.Czon. •
4"Repor= on the Assignment Analysis and Compensation Studies
for the Police and Fire Services, City of Los Angelcs, 'March 1970. Tire,
pp. 3S-39.
Jacobs Company, Inc., Chicago, Ill.,
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"Sworn personnel, who, in various unpr-,d1ctab?4 situa_
tions, are requires to Make difficult judgemo:,ts, ,
should possess a sound knowledge o- society a:;d
human behavior. This can best be attained th-ough
advanced education: ...
"S
It has been recognized in recent years that tho'ratury of
police work is changing as society changes, requiring additional
legal and social skills and abilities on the job. These chantez have '
been reflected in trends designed to upgrade the level of police s'.cilis..
and abilities and in higher cos:pensation for police offfcars. One of,,
these trends is the break in panty in the salaries pai4 antry-lc;vci
policemen and firemen, started in the City of Berkeley,now wide -spread.,
among cities throughout the State, including Alameda. .'mother devalor; ';
ment has been the establishment of P.O,S.T, (Police Officers Standards:
and Training). This program, begun in 1960, provides supplemental
training opportunities to existing departmental and college training
programs. A third trend has been the establishment: of gducation inccn21'
tive programs among cities throughout the state, fncludirg Alamoda, '•"
designed to encourage and reward police employees for c-, loping
additional skills and abilities to keep up with the char.�in; nature
of law enforcement duties and requirements and to gain. �crsonal improve-
ment as an aid to advancement and promotion. (EXHIBIT 1-I includes a
copy of Alameda's educational incentive plan regulation") Since the
first educational incentive program was initiated in Baikeley in 1967,'4, ,
there has been a rapid increase in this form of supplemental coil?ensatio:;,
STask Force Report: The Police, The President"P Commission a,, -
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, p.;126.
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According to the P.O.S.T, publication, "rmployr.ent Onportun:ei4c ;.n
Law Enforcement, 1971",'93 out of 351 law cnforcc.nent agcncias '_urveyad
in the state had some form ofeducation incentive pay. �Sost of these `'' ;•
programs, including Alameda's, are tied in part to tFic ? O.S.T. basic,-..
intermediate and advanced certificates which are based, oxaopt for a
grandfather provision, on a combination of educational attainment and ;
length of service.
In comparing this rapid increase of education incentive supply-• -
mental pay plans in recent years, one notes with interest the lack of
any growth of "pure" longevity pay plans. The number of such plano
among departments in the state, peaked in about 1970, and since Chen,
two departments have dropped their plans for new hirces. These trends x•
are not surprising since the nature of police wort: has chany.:d and is.
changing, and there has been determined effort by police t'rrouS,hout the:,
clop professionalism in law errorcement.
scare to encourage and dev
longevity pay plans fly in tFze lace of these trends, and:implies that am-; ;
officer should obtain additional salary just for St -eking with the jab "
for a specified number of years, regardless of whether or not he attcn,?r. •s
to keep up with the changing role of police work. rrom tho City's point
of view, and presumably from the point of view of those police agencies•
and amployea organizations which Nava supported educatiaral incentive
rather than longevity pay programs, it; makos mole senso to oncourana ;
police professionalism and motivate officers to gain more education
skills to do a better job during a time that the role of tFia police otflci,r
is changing, rather than just emphasizing sittin; on a job until retirti;.::ii4.
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2. It is further contended that. in Alm:ada a lon^cylt.v_,;z?
program could discourane the ttse r)f t;.a eclucationai
While the Association's proposal would be in addition to
education incentive pay, the amount of the longevity ;say a:tcr L5 and
20 years is either slightly less than or slightly more Lhan the ;r•.cunt
received under the education incentive program. This could mot:vace
some officers to discontinue meeting the requirements of the educatio:4
incentive plan, i.e„ not tatting classes in law enforcerlenc and r� Lateti
subjects, since they could receive roughly the some coutuansatlon without:;
malting the extra effort to meet these requirements. Lo :gcvity pay, chon,
could run counter to the City's well established oducatibn incc:ntiv.:
program and, in part, minimiac the positives effect it ha; had, in the
opinion of the Department's adminij-ration, on th- abilities of the
Department's officers. It makes more sense, i�' lon4cvit7 is to b4
recognized as supplemental pay, to tie it to an educatianal incentive ,•
program, in order that the positive effect of this program will not be
undermined in any way. ,
3. Longevity Pay is incoui table since it banez"its sat.: ' ,
but not others -who have similar authoritv and resnonsi'ailit_ey.
An analysis prepared in July 1973 shows that of: the 93 ;mploy0s.
in the u:tit represented by the PoLica Association, only 33, including,
19 Patrolmen, ten Sergeants and six Lieutenants, would roceiv:: to:vcvtCy +
pay, This would mean that5O,officers in these three cicossisicatiaus
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doing similar work, with similar authority and _esponsiSility, woul
ti • • '
' be paid less under this proposal. Also, among the 35 officers proposed
to receive longevity pay, 14 obtaining 21 percent, sevew receiving 5
r ,
percent and 14 getting 711 percent, there would be variations in compen-
sation among these officers not justified by the duties .porformad or:
responsibilities assumed. This does not mean nor implywthat variat$dn
in duties, responsibilities and abilities may not occur. -among employees
in the camp classification, but there is no evidence that these varia-
tions are related to "pure" tenure or seniority. As one police text: -
points out in arguing against inclusion of longevity pay - as a parson:,cl•
benefit, "Beyond a certain level, performance does not necessarily
improve with age; the maximum improvement in any position generally
takes place within the first few years..."6
4. Longevity pay is an unusually expensive benefit in terms.
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of pension costs to the City.
Since the pension allowance under the 1079 pension system is
based upon the highest amount of salary or compcnsation''attached to the
A
rank, and since longevity pay probably would be considered salary for..,
pension purposes,7 each qualified pensioner would recoOb- an additionat` '
71Z percent increase in his allowance under the Association's proposal. '
It is estimated that the first year pension cost of this longevity ,
proposal would be between 1.8 percent (Association's figure) and 2.3;• ;
percent (City's figure) of payroll, in addition to the Mrmal cost ot,
the program of 1.83 percept for zurrent employees. Thig has the follow
60. W. Wilson and Roy C. 'McLaren,, Police Administration, '• '•
Third Edition, p. 282. L;
7McDermott vs. City of Alameda. ;ior Court, No. 422S07.'
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ing implications:
a. The benefit costs substantially more than the agreed to `
3.3 percent benefit package,
b. If the addiLionai pension costs are not ap'ropriately part
of the 3.3 percent package, V!ich the City contends they are, than the•'; ,
City would be expending a substantial sum for benefits riot currently
applicably to employees in the Association's bargaining unit, diminisliing1. '.
the City's financial ability to honor other salary or benefit raquestd,:'
by the Association.
c. The cost of a 1.83 percent of payroll for'•longevity pay,
z
would increase the 1079 pension payroll by 7.5 percent, while a 1.83•'
fipercent of payroll improvement in educati-.n incentive pay, salary or ,
holiday pay, would increase the pension payroll by only 1.83 percent.';`'••`
Therefore, the impact of longevity pay upon city pension costs is sub"
stantially greater than salary or supplemental salary increases. ;
j SUS C?ARY
It is the City's position that the Police Association has the
burden of proof in demonstrating that longevity pay is rppropriate as..,
1 part of a benefit package for Alameda Police. While not assuming -this'.,.
j burden of proof, the City contends that,longevity pay i� inappropriate,,
as part of the compensation package for the employees 'represented by
the Alameda Police Department. The reasons for this contention are that
i it is not supported by pertinent prevailing practice, Tither in the "•:.
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immediate labor market area, the San Francisco Bay Arad, Northern
California or the State. Also, the longevity pay proposal is not
supported by other criteria normally used to determine,:if such a ,
proposal is appropriate such as: the improvement of recruitment; '
the reduction of turnover; the retention of erperienceO employees;
as a supplemental salary due to infrequent salary increases, inability,:;'
to keep up with the cost of living or to maintain a competitive salary$''•,
or total ca'npensation position with other comparable employers; and
to compensate for the lack of advancement within the Department.
Finally, the City contends that longevity pay is inappropriate as
a benefit in the Police Department from a policy viewpoint, because A
it does not reflect the unique character of local police compersatior,' ;
and the current trends the nature of th''is compensation -is taking, it,
could discourage the use of the City's excellent educational incentive
program, it is inequitable among certain police employees, and it is ,'
an unusually expensive benefit compared to other benefits. For these...
,
reasons, the City urges that longevity pay bek considered inappropriate,.'.
as an item part of the 3.3 percent benefit package. „
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